DOCUMENT
WHY
I AM NOT A TRADITIONALIST
© Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen - 2002
Abstract
After presenting some background information on the historical
climate that gave rise to the traditionalism of Guénon, Coomaraswamy
and their followers, I discuss the major tenets of this school
of thought and offer some criticisms. Although I find much
in the traditionalist critique of modernism to be insightful,
and the reverence of authentic tradition to be inspiring,
in the final analysis, traditionalism seems to be too reactionary
and too nostalgic to offer a workable way to move through
and beyond modernity. Its positive theses about perennial
philosophy romanticize the occult aspects of the world’s religious
traditions and are backed by unsupported assumptions, tenuous
comparisons based on a prejudiced selection of materials,
and rather wild speculations. In conclusion, I humbly offer
a few suggestions for a more balanced view of religion and
modernity.
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Introduction
In
an interview in 1989, the Yale historian of Christianity Jaroslav
Pelikan said: “Tradition is the living faith of the dead;
traditionalism is the dead faith of the living. Tradition
lives in conversation with the past, while remembering where
we are and when we are and that it is we who have to decide.
Traditionalism supposes that nothing should ever be done
for the first time, so all that is needed to solve any problem
is to arrive at the supposedly unanimous testimony of this homogenized
tradition.” [1]
Traditionalism is a modern European reaction against modernism. It
has appeared in a variety of religious movements: Jewish, Catholic,
Protestant and Islamic. In what follows, I am particularly concerned
to address a specifically Islamic form of traditionalism that
traces itself to the writings of Rene Guenon and Ananda Coomaraswamy,
but it is useful first to take a brief look at Catholic traditionalism
in order to gain a better understanding of the historical roots
of traditionalism generally.
Traditionalism is a paradoxically modern reaction against modernism
whose roots are to be found in 19th century Europe,
especially France. There, Catholic opponents of secularism and
modernism defended a traditionalism based on the authority of
the Pope. While there was a liberal wing of this ultramontanist
movement, Pius IX (1846-1878) became decisively hostile to all
liberalism in political and intellectual life after he temporarily
lost the Papal States after the revolution of 1848. Pius's Syllabus
of Errors (1864) proclaimed that the pope "cannot and
should not be reconciled and come to terms with progress, liberalism,
and modern civilization." [2] The movement to reaffirm papal authority culminated in the doctrine
of papal infallibility in 1870, although in that same year Vatican
Council I in its Dei filius sought to appear moderate
by condemning both traditionalism (defined as a denial of the
ability of natural reason to achieve certainty on any religious
truth) and modern forms of rationalism. Despite the wording,
Catholicism explicitly opposed modernism in favor of its own
traditions and the authority of the pope. Catholic opposition
to modernism was much diminished after Vatican Council II (1962-65),
but prior to that the Church saw itself as a defender of tradition
against the political and intellectual currents that had swept
over Europe. In 19th century England, the Catholic
lead in defending tradition became a controversial issue among
Anglicans, with liberals in the Church of England accusing traditionalists
of moving too close to Roman Catholicism. Catholic sympathy
was aroused in England by French clerics who sought refuge in
England after the revolution. Before mid-century, the leader
of the traditionalist Oxford movement, John Henry Newman (1801-1890),
converted to Roman Catholicism, became a priest and was eventually
appointed cardinal.
The reaction against
modernism in 19th century Europe took various forms,
only one of which is found in the stance taken by the Roman
Catholic Church. Fundamentalist Protestants also began to make
use of anti-modernist rhetoric, especially in the United States.
The religiously conservative stance against modernism also found
expression in literature, of which the best examples are to
be found in the poetry of T. S. Eliot (1888-1965) and in his
enormously influential essay, “Tradition and the Individual
Talent.” [3]
Eliot moved from America to England, converted to
the Church of England and supported religious traditionalism
within Anglicanism.
French Catholicism
in the 19th century supported both tradition and
monarchy. In the latter half of the 19th century,
French liberals gained the upper hand over monarchists, and
imposed a number of anti-clerical laws. The movement for such
anti-clerical laws was instigated by Léon Gambetta (1838-1882)
in his speech at Romans, 18 September, 1878, containing the
famous catchword "Le cléricalisme, c'est l'ennemi".
Catholics alleged that such anti-clericalism was due to the
influence of the Masonic lodges.[4]
The
Masons provided an alternative to Catholic traditionalism based
on alleged ancient occult sciences, and in French society they
tended to attract free thinkers and anti-clerics, as well as
those interested in occult speculations.
Nineteenth century France also exhibited a
fascination with the Orient in its art, as is witnessed in the
number of French painters who took up oriental themes, such
as Jean-Léon Jérôme (1824-1904), Alexandre-Gabriel Decamps (1803-1860),
Jean Dominique Ingres (1780-1867), Charles Bargue (1825/26–1883),
Léon Bonnat (1833–1922), Jean-Joseph Benjamin-Constant (1845–1902),
Eugène Fromentin (1820–1876), Charles-Théodore Frère (1814–1888),
to mention only a few.
The
fascination with the Orient, and the occult and ancient also
helped attract members to the Theosophical Society founded by
Madame Blavatsky, Colonel Henry S. Olcott, and W. Q. Judge in
1876 in New York City. In turn, the Theosophical Society published
a number of translations from non-Western religious traditions,
including a French translation of the Gita in 1890, and
other works on Buddhism and Hinduism. In 1879, Olcott and Blavatsky
moved to India, where they propagated their faith among Europeans
and Indians. In 1882, they bought property at Adyar, near Madras,
and the international headquarters of the society is still located
there. Various national headquarters were also established in
the US and European countries. While in India, Olcott became
a Buddhist and traveled throughout Sri Lanka, where he led a
movement to revive Buddhism. Olcott and the Theosophical Society
founded Ananda College and several other Buddhist schools, and,
for this, Olcott is still revered in Sri Lanka.
It
is in the context of this cultural atmosphere that an esoteric
form of traditionalism was developed in the writings of two
fascinating and erudite authors, Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877-1947)
and René Guénon (1886-1951).
Ananda
Kentish Coomaraswamy was born in Ceylon, raised in England at
his mother’s home after the death of his Tamil father when he
was two, and studied at London University where he was awarded
a doctorate in geology. Between 1906 and 1917 he made frequent
trips to India and Ceylon, and became president of the Ceylon
Reform Society, dedicated to the revitalization of Sinhalese
culture, an aim that was also supported to the Theosophical
Society in Ceylon since 1880. He joined the Theosophical Society
in 1907. In 1917, as a conscientious objector to British conscription,
he emigrated to the US where he became curator of the Indian
and Asian sections of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. Although
he published various works in journals and presses of the Theosophical
Society, he was critical of the movement, especially with regard
to the understanding of the doctrine of reincarnation. Nevertheless,
it is generally agreed that his introduction to metaphysical
thought and the idea of an essential unity underlying the mystical
traditions of the world came to him through the Theosophical
Society. From 1932 until his death, he concentrated his energies
on writing about what he called the philosophia perennis.
His works on Indian art continue to be highly respected by scholars.
René
Guénon came from a devout Catholic family and his early education
was in Jesuit schools. He had a delicate personality, and when
he felt that his teachers were persecuting him, his father had
him transferred to the College Augustin-Thierry, where he completed baccalaureates
in mathematics and philosophy. He was a brilliant student
and won prizes in physics and Latin. He enrolled in the Collège
Rollin in Paris, in 1904 to study mathematics, but withdrew
after two years. In 1906 he became a protégé of Gérard Encausse,
known as “Papus,” who was a co-founder of the Theosophical Society
in France. Papus had split off from the Theosophical Society
to form the Faculté des Sciences
Hermétique, and Guénon later disassociated himself
from both. He vigorously condemned Theosophy in several of his
writings, in which he claimed that it was based on a corruption
of perennial first principles. Nevertheless, like Coomaraswamy,
important ideas about metaphysics and the esoteric unity of
religious traditions were introduced to him through Theosophy.[5]
While in Paris, Guénon also joined other occultist
groups and became a Freemason. Although Guénon never renounced
Freemasonry as he did Theosophy and continued throughout his
life to write on Masonic themes and symbolism, although after
leaving Paris, he did not participate in Masonic activities,
and his continued interest seems to have been purely intellectual.
In 1912 he embraced Islam, and through Abdul-Hadi, a Swedish
initiate, he joined the Sufi order of the Egyptian master Shaykh
`Abd al-Rahman `Illaysh al-Kabir. After a short stint as instructor
of philosophy in Algeria, Guénon entered the doctoral program
in Sanskrit at the Sorbonne where he studied with Stanislav
Levi. Although he did not complete his doctorate, apparently
because he refused to provide the required references and notes
for his thesis, the dissertation was published to general scholarly
acclaim as Introduction générale à l'étude des Doctrines
hindoues (1921). After the death of his French wife, he
moved to Cairo in 1930 where he remarried, had four children,
became an Egyptian citizen known as Shaykh `Abd al-Wahid Yahya
and remained for the rest of his life. He is the author of twenty-nine
books and roughly five hundred articles and reviews.
Coomaraswamy and Guénon corresponded and attracted a number of followers,
a number of which became influential authors and promoters of
traditionalism, including Frithjof Schuon, Titus Burkhardt,
Marco Pallis, Martin Lings, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Huston Smith,
and others. These writers defend a number of common doctrines:
Tradition
is the continuity of Revelation: an uninterrupted transmission,
through innumerable generations, of the spiritual and cosmological
principles, sciences and laws resulting from a revealed religion:
nothing is neglected, from the establishment of social orders
and codes of conduct to the canons regulating the arts and
architecture, ornamentation and dress; it includes the mathematical,
physical, medical and psychological sciences, encompassing
moreover those deriving from celestial movements. What contrasts
it totally with our modem learning, which is a closed system
materially, is its reference to all things back to superior
planes of being, and eventually to ultimate Principles: considerations
entirely unknown to modern man.
[6]
[TOP]
Traditionalism
or Modernism?
In
order to evaluate the claims of Traditionalism as expounded
by Coomaraswamy, Guénon and their followers, we need a more
complete account of that claims made by Traditionalism than
the statement by Whitehall Perry given above. Since the main
thrust of my criticism of Traditionalism aims at its rejection
of modernity, it is important to make it clear at the outset
that in criticizing Traditionalism, I am not endorsing modernism.
The basic point is that nothing should be accepted or rejected
merely because it is modern and likewise, nothing should be
accepted or rejected merely because it is traditional. There
is much that is good in modernity, and much that is good in
traditional societies. There is much that is bad in modernity,
and much that is bad in traditional societies. These obvious
facts seem to be ignored by Traditionalists and modernists,
and so, both Traditionalism and modernism should be rejected.
Every claim and every practice must be subject to critical evaluation
according to the criteria of religion and reason.
Modernity,
Modernism and Modernization
Modernity
is first of all a period of European history stretching from
the aftermath of the Reformation through the twentieth century.
Secondly, it is a cultural condition. During the modern period
European society acquired a number of striking interrelated
characteristics: economically, there was a shift from an agrarian
to an industrial economy; politically, the institution of the
nation-state began to displace monarchical rule, liberalism
and secularism gained ground against the allied powers of the
nobility and the Church; socially, individualism and social
mobility began to take precedence over family and community
and technology came to play an ever more important role in the
private and public spheres that emerged; philosophically, Enlightenment
rationalism and empiricism became dominant; in science, new
methods of exact measurement and applied mathematics were developed;
in the arts, there was a shift from iconic art to naturalism
and then expressivism; and in theology, historical method and
an emphasis on religious experience became prominent. Virtually
every aspect of human life changed in ways that previously would
not have been imaginable. When conditions such as these come
to characterize a society, whether European or not, the society
is said to have become modernized. In Europe and elsewhere,
modernization has been met with enthusiastic support as well
as resistance. The optimistic advocacy of modernization is modernism.
There are other more specialized meanings that have been given
to the terms modernity, modernization and modernism,
but they are not immediately relevant to our discussion.
Traditions,
Tradition and Traditionalism
The
term traditional is perhaps even more vague than modern.
It is generally understood in contrast to modern. Whatever
was deeply ingrained in society prior to modernization is traditional.
Indirectly, the traditional is understood in terms of European
history, since the traditional is defined in contrast to the
modern, which in turn can only be understood with reference
to European culture. To call a non-Western society traditional
is therefore to claim that it is similar in important ways to
Europe before the Reformation. In contast to modernism,
traditionalism could be used to designate any movement
of resistance to modernization, or the view that pre-modern
societies are superior to modernized societies. In this sense,
one speaks not of traditionalism per se, but of Catholic traditionalism,
Russian traditionalism, etc.
Since it would be
extremely implausible to advocate an absolute traditionalism,
i.e., the thesis that modernity is always worse than whatever
it replaces, Coomaraswamy and Guénon introduced the notion of
authentic traditions as those rooted in divine revelation.
They claimed that there were common features to be found across
pre-modern societies, whether aboriginal, Christian, Islamic,
Hindu, Taoist or Buddhist.[7] It is the common features of these societies that
are called tradition, and the advocacy of these features
over those of modern societies is Traditionalism. Thus,
traditionalism includes a thesis of a specific form of religious
pluralism, that all the authentic religious traditions are divinely
inspired and are at the innermost core the same, as well as
a cultural thesis that asserts that the cultural institutions
of societies dominated by authentic tradition are justified
as reflections of Tradition. Both of these theses are dubious.
I have made a case against Traditionalist religious pluralism
elsewhere, [8]
so here I will only touch on the main points.
[TOP]
Problems
with Esoteric Pluralism
The
sort of religious pluralism advocated by Traditionalists is
one that it takes over from Theosophy. Even if Guénon decisively
rejected the Theosophical Society, the key ideas of the Traditionalists
regarding the unity of religions: (1) that all the major religions
have a divine source; (2) that esoterically they are the same
but exoterically different; and (3) that traces of the original
perennial wisdom are to be found in the religions, are clearly
stated by Madame Blavatsky in the introduction to The Secret
Doctrine:
The true philosopher,
the student of the Esoteric Wisdom, entirely loses sight of
personalities, dogmatic beliefs and special religions. Moreover,
Esoteric philosophy reconciles all religions, strips every one
of its outward, human garments, and shows the root of each to
be identical with that of every other great religion. [9]
The
main differences between Blavatsky and the Traditionalists are:
(1) she rejects the concept of a personal God found in the monotheistic
religions as exoterically interpreted in favor of a more pantheistic
view; (2) she considers Christianity to have deviated from the
original doctrine, especially after Constantine, and in general,
she holds that the forms of religion now found in the world
are all to a greater or lesser extent deviations from the original
doctrine she claims to have uncovered.
Like
the Traditionalists, Blavatsky holds that the esoteric teachings
of the religions constitute a perennial wisdom:
[T]he
now Secret Wisdom was once the one fountain head,
the ever-flowing perennial source, at which were fed all its
streamlets -- the later religions of all nations -- from the
first down to the last.[10]
Guénon
came to the conclusion that Madame Blavatsky was a charlatan.
However, the form of religious pluralism she espoused was retained
by him and further elaborated in his writings and those of other
Traditionalists. This is not the place to evaluate Blavatsky’s
credentials, and even if there is much in her writings that
cannot stand up to scholarly scrutiny, that by itself does not
prove that there is anything wrong with the type of pluralism
she advocated, let alone the subtly different form of pluralism
found in Traditionalist writings.
What’s
wrong with the sort of pluralism advocated by Blavatsky and
the Traditionalists is that it depends on a rather questionable
reading of the texts of the world’s religions. It requires that
one hold that certain similarities in doctrine, especially esoteric
doctrine, constitute the core of the religions, and that differences
be dismissed as deviations. Blavatsky supported this interpretation
with the dubious claim that she had discovered the original
secret teachings. The Traditionalists, on the other hand, claim
that through intellectual intuition they are able to discern
the common essence. The method used is implausible. It is assumed
at the outset that the religions have a common esoteric essence,
and the texts are interpreted so as to accord with this principle.
This is question begging.
The
second major flaw common to most forms of religious pluralism
is that the teachings of the religions seem to be inconsistent
with one another, and with pluralism, regardless whether we
examine their esoteric or exoteric doctrines. Pluralists are
forced to claim that these contradictions are either due to
corruptions in the religious traditions, or are due to inessential
factors, such as culture. This sort of claim is not supported
by an examination of the texts, but only by an a priori
conviction of the truth of pluralism.
These
objections to pluralism are made by appeal to standards of good
scholarship in religious studies. More importantly, however,
there are theological grounds within Islamic teachings to reject
the religious pluralism of the Traditionalists. The problem
is not merely that Islam forbids idol worship, while idol worship
is intrinsic to the non-monotheistic traditions. The problem
is where the criterion for religious truth is to be found. According
to Islam that criterion is given in God’s final revelation to
man, while according to Traditionalism it is something to be
abstracted by intellectual intuition through a comparative interpretation
of the world’s esoteric religious teachings.
This
theological criticism is not merely theoretical. It has practical
consequences, as well. For example, Islam presents a relatively
egalitarian social ideal in which no distinctions in religious
duty are made on the basis of social standing, occupation, color
or race. There is no priesthood in Islam. Hinduism, on the other
hand, not only has a priesthood, but it is enshrined in the
caste system. Traditionalists such as Martin Lings continue
to defend the Hindu caste system as being a part of authentic
tradition, rather than condemning it on the basis of Islamic
teachings.
But thanks
to the caste system with the Brahmins as safeguarders of religion
we have today a Hinduism which is still living and which down
to this century has produced flowers of sanctity. [11]
What
is essential here is to see what criterion is being used for
evaluative religious and moral judgments. Instead of making
their evaluations from within the framework or Islam, Traditionalists
base their evaluations on the conceit that they can view all
of the religions from some higher transcendent perspective.
The
flaws of esoteric religious pluralism may be summed up by listing
the following points.
Intellectual
intuition, even if accepted as a valid way of obtaining knowledge,
does not support esoteric pluralism.
Esoteric
differences among the religious differences are proportionate
to their exoteric differences. Common features among religious
traditions may be found by abstracting and generalizing from
their exoteric features no less than from their esoteric features.
Religious
pluralists use a question-begging methodology in their reading
of religious texts.
Pluralists
gloss over important differences in order to eliminate contradictions.
Pluralism
conflicts with Islamic teaching, because Islam presents itself
as the final and definitive religion for mankind and not as
culture bound, while pluralism sees the differences between
Islam and other traditions to be due to cultural accidents.
Islam
offers a basically egalitarian social vision, while Traditionalists
social differences such as are found in the caste system as
manifestations of the hierarchical nature of being.
Traditionalists
use tradition and the intellectual intuition of the principles
of sophia perennis as their criteria of evaluation instead
of the principles of Islam.
[TOP]
The
Traditionalist Critique of Modernism
Problems with the Traditionalist cultural thesis are best understood
in terms of their critique of modernism. According to this thesis,
the characteristics of traditional societies are manifestations
of the divine principles on which they are based, and thus,
the characteristics of modern societies, insofar as they deviate
from tradition, are to be rejected.
Many critics of modernity have drawn attention to points
upon which traditionalists focus their critique, e.g., scientism,
atomistic individualism, lack of spirituality. They are important
points. Guénon, Coomaraswamy and other traditionalists are to
be credited with seeing through the illusions of modernism at
a time when its allure was at a peak. Martin Lings describes
the mood after the First World War as follows:
I myself
remember that world in which and for which Guénon wrote his
earliest books, in the first decade after the First World
War, a monstrous world made impenetrable by euphoria: the
First World War had been the war to end war. Now there would
never be another war; and science had proved that man was
descended from the ape, that is, he had progressed from apehood,
and now this progress would continue with nothing to impede
it; everything would get better and better and better….I remember
a politician proclaiming, as who would dare to do today, "We
are now in the glorious morning of the world." And at
this same time, Guénon wrote of this wonderful world, "It
is as if an organism with its head cut off were to go on living
a life which was both intense and disordered." (from
East and West, first published in 1924).[12]
As we have seen, Coomaraswamy and Guénon did not invent dissatisfaction
with modernity. A long line of poets and thinkers who found
much in modern culture appalling preceded them. Since the very
inception of the industrial revolution, there has been no lack
of voices proclaiming that society and culture had taken a wrong
turn, that something valuable was being lost and destroyed.
Among the voices of dissent may be found Romantic poets, like
Blake and Wordsworth, Catholic ultramontanists, philosophers
from Nietzsche to Heidegger, and, not surprisingly, Blavatsky
and Olcott.
So,
what is distinctive about the traditionalist critique of modernity?
It is not unprecedented, so the distinctive feature is not historical
originality. Some critics of modernity focused on the social
problems of modern life, while others have been more theoretical.
Usually, however, the two are combined, and it is held that
the social problems of modernity are a result of neglect of
some important truths. For the Catholics, modern woes are due
to neglect of the teachings of the Church. For the Romantics,
the neglected truth is one that can only be grasped through
the heart, or some sort of feeling or experience. For Heidegger,
the problems of modern society are the result of a long progressive
neglect of the question of Being stretching back to antiquity.
For Blavatsky, Olcott, Guénon and Coomaraswamy, the problems
of modernity arise from neglect of the perennial wisdom found
in the esoteric teachings of the great religions, although it
must be admitted that Guénon and Coomaraswamy went way beyond
what was implicit in the writings of the Theosophists.
In
all of these groups there is a common implausible causal claim,
that the neglect of some truths is what causes the problems
associated with modernity. As far as I know, none of the members
of any of the groups mentioned does anything to substantiate
this claim. It is taken to be obvious that since moderns have
neglected the Truth and have various social problems, the neglect
is the cause of the social problems. Consider the following
statement by Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr:
But the
opposition of tradition to modernism, which is total and complete
as far as principles are concerned, does not derive from the
observation of facts and phenomena or the diagnosis of the
symptoms of the malady. It is based upon a study of the causes
which have brought about the illness. Tradition is opposed
to modernism because it considers the premises upon which
modernism is based to be wrong and false in principle.[13]
This is a gross
oversimplification. The relation between modern thought and
the characteristics of modern societies is a complex one in
which social changes influence thought and vice versa. In order
to understand the problems of modernity, more observation of
facts and phenomena is needed than metaphysics. European modernization
took place as European societies became increasingly industrialized.
The changes wrought by industrialization led to shifts in political
power and authority, and these shifts are reflected in modern
political philosophies, including Marxism, liberalism and the
various forms of traditionalism, for the reactions against the
changes that accompanied industrialization are no less modern
than the positivistic euphoria assailed by Guénon and Lings.
Another
dubious feature of the Traditionalist critique of modernity
that stems from the idea that social forms are products of dominant
beliefs is that there is a tendency among Traditionalists to
glorify pre-modern social structures because they are seen as
products of true Traditional beliefs. Guénon writes:
What we
call normal civilization is a civilization which is based
on principles, in the true sense of the term, and where everything
is ordained and hierarchically arranged in conformity with
these principles, so that everything there is seen as the
application and extension of a doctrine purely intellectual
or metaphysical in its essence; this is what we mean also
when we speak of a “tradiitonal” civilization.[14]
In this way, the evils of feudalism are to be excused because feudalism
is seen as an institution that was produced by a society dominated
by Traditional beliefs and values and in turn the system protected
those beliefs and values. The social pressures that made the
feudal system intolerable and led to its overthrow are ignored,
and the shift is glossed as having been brought about by a neglect
of the perennial wisdom on which feudal society was based!
In place of the modernist faith in unlimited progress in which technology
and “enlightened” thinking are supposed to lead to a continual
improvement in the human condition, Traditionalists posit that
modernization is a process of unmitigated decline, explained
by Guénon in terms of the grand cycles of Hindu cosmology. While
modernists seem blind to the spiritual crisis of modern man,
the rape of the environment, the evils of colonialism and neo-colonialism,
the weakening of the family, etc., Traditionalists seem blind
to the benefits brought by modernization, the vast increase
in literacy and availability of education, public health and
sanitation, more humane treatment of prisoners and the insane,
etc. The benefits of modernization cannot be ignored any more
than its failings, even when judged not by the standards of
modernity itself, but in accordance with traditional values.
It is pointless to attempt any overall evaluation by which to
justify the claim that modernity is better than what preceded
it or worse. In some respects it is better, and in other respects
worse.
While
Traditionalists devote much of their attention to the evil aspects
of modernity, there is relatively little analysis of the major
themes of modern writers, such as inwardness, the importance
of ordinary life, the moral resources within the self, the ideal
of authenticity, liberal political ideals, naturalism, or autonomy,
to mention a few of the most important.
[15] For a meaningful criticism of modernity to
take place without falling into reactionary posturing, an examination
of the development of such themes in modern writing is required
as well as a review of how such themes have gradually come to
be reflected in modern culture and society generally.
[16] Simply to pit the evils of modernity against
sacred Tradition provides little help with understanding either
modernity or traditional societies, or how they interact.
According to Catholic traditionalists, the traditions of the Church
are sacred because the Holy Spirit guides the Church through
history. This doctrine means that practices and beliefs that
have no other justification than that they have been around
as long as anyone can remember are given an aura of holiness.
It also makes any deviation from accepted practices and beliefs
seem demonic. Something like this doctrine may be found among
Traditionalists, as well. There are several differences. First,
they do not limit themselves to a particular religion, as do
the Catholics. Second, they do not base the attribution of sacredness
on the guidance of the Holy Spirit, but on the guidance of “true
principles,” sophia perennis and intellectual intuition.
Nevertheless, both Catholic and Guénonian traditionalists see
traditions as sacred because they are in some way manifestations
or elaborations of divine revelation. Revelation becomes manifest
in tradition. This sort of veneration of tradition results in
a very extreme sort of conservatism, one that is open to moral
criticism according to the very tenets and values of the traditions
the Traditionalist pretends to defend.
Traditionalism
is an ideology, in the general sense that it offers a system
of ideas on the basis of which it recommends a social or political
program. Of course, Traditionalism differs from many other ideologies
in that while they concentrate on political action, Traditionalism
is focused on metaphysics, and takes a political position only
derivatively. Nevertheless, and more specifically, it is an
ideology in the sense that it: (1) contains a more or less comprehensive
theory about the world and the place of man in it; (2) sets
out a general program of social and political direction; (3)
it foresees itself as surviving through onslaughts against it;
(4) it seeks not merely to persuade but to recruit loyal adherents,
demanding what is sometimes called commitment; (5) it addresses
a wide public but tends to confer some special role of leadership
on intellectuals. [17] It is yet another
“ism”, another maktab, that has emerged out of the European
experience of modernity. This is ironic, because Traditionalists
condemn ideology generally as a product of modernity.
[18] So, Traditionalism is self-defeating, in the
sense that its condemnation of everything modern is so general
that it implicitly condemns itself, since Traditionalism itself
is a modern ideology founded by Coomaraswamy and Guénon prior
to World War II.
As for the political program of Traditionalism, it is perhaps most
clearly stated by Dr. Nasr:
In the
political domain, the traditional perspective always insists
upon realism based upon Islamic norms. In the Sunni world,
it accepts the classical caliphate and, in its absence, the
other political institutions, such as the sultanate, which
developed over the centuries in the light of the teachings
of the Sharí‘ah and the needs of the community.
Under no condition, however, does it seek to destroy what
remains of traditional Islamic political institutions…. As
for the Shi‘ite world, the traditional perspective continues
to insist that final authority belongs to the Twelfth Imam,
in whose absence no form of government can be perfect. In
both worlds, the traditional perspective remains always aware
of the fall of the community from its original perfection,
the danger of destroying traditional Islamic institutions
and substituting those of modern, Western, origin…. [19]
As I understand
Islam, many Sunni and Shi‘ah Muslims are in agreement that at
least after the first four caliphs, the caliphate has been a
complete disaster in which lust for power, empire building and
personal extravagance dominated the institution even as it claimed
to rule in the name of Islam. The martyrdom of Imam Husaynu rescued Islam from its association with such decadence by testifying
that the caliphate had become in fact a force opposed to everything
genuine Islam stands for. This sort of understanding of Islamic
history seems unavailable to Traditionalists who laud governments
based on the sovereignty of sultans and so-called caliphs as
traditional, while playing down the corruptions and excesses
of such governments as imperfections that should be tolerated
to prevent the danger that some Western model of government
might come to power. This is reactionary politics at its worst.
In sum, although
there is much insight into modernity’s flaws in Traditionalist
writings, the Traditionalist critique of modernity suffers from
the following defects:
First,
there is the dubious idea that explicit or implicit belief in
various principles causes a society to have the characteristics
it exhibits, so that the ills of modernity are simplistically
attributed to deviations in beliefs.
Second,
Traditionalists contrast the evils of modernity with a romanticized
picture of traditional societies.
Third,
the Traditionalist analysis of pre-modern societies fails to
do justice to the essential differences among them because it
is motivated by the a priori assumption that they are
all based on shared principles.
Fourth,
Traditionalists view modernization as unmitigated decline because
they take adherence to Tradition as their evaluative standard
rather than the standards inherent to the traditions themselves.
This criticism may be presented as a logical one, revealing
a contradiction inherent in the Traditionalist position, or
as a theological criticism, that Traditionalism exalts Tradition
in a manner not sanctioned by Islamic teachings.
Fifth,
the Traditionalist critique of modernity is based on intuitions
about the deviant principles that dominate modern society rather
than on historical analysis.
Sixth,
deviation from Tradition is condemned without regard to any
evaluation of whether change could be merited, because change
is seen as opposition to the sacred as it has become manifest
in tradition. While it presents itself as inheritor of the sapiential
legacy of the traditional cultures of the world, in fact it
impedes the exercise of wisdom to critically examine the conditions
of what are considered to be authentic traditional societies.
Seventh,
while Traditionalists condemn ideology as a modern phenomenon,
what they offer is itself an ideology.
Eighth,
Traditionalism is politically reactionary.
Traditionalism fails in its criticism
of modernity because it makes use of an arcane methodology and
ignores the details of history, it oversimplifies the characters
of both modern and traditional societies, and by making Tradition
itself the standard of its evaluations, it violates the moral
principles of the traditions it claims to champion. As an ideology,
Traditionalism makes no provision for meaningful debate about
how to improve society, reform its institutions or confront
the changes that are taking place, because all deviations from
tradition, glorified as the manifestation of divine principles,
is opposed. Thus, the failings of the Traditional critique are
both methodological and theological. Despite these failures,
Traditionalist ideology may serve the useful purpose of fomenting
some resistance to those who advocate modernization, development
and industrialization in imitation of the Western model, and
perhaps it is vain to hope for a more reasoned and nuanced approach
to modernity. Traditionalism succeeds in pointing out many important
faults in modernity: the loss of the sacred with the rise of
secularism, the loss of intrinsic value with the rise of instrumental
rationality, the loss of art and vocation with the industrialization
and automation, and the loss of a coherent world view with the
emergence of pluralism, diversification and specialization.
[20] However, others have observed these faults,
too. What is valuable in the Traditionalist critique of modernity
is not original, and what is original is not valuable.
[TOP]
The
Inescapability of Modernity
Traditionalists
offer no alternative to modernity because they fail to come
to grips with its dynamics and instead wallow in nostalgia.
When this criticism was explicitly leveled against Coomaraswamy,
he responded that he did not wish to return to the Middle Ages. [21] Nevertheless, in speaking of the possibility
of regeneration in the West, he says, “The possibility exists
only in the event of a return to first principles and to the
normal ways of living that proceed from the application of first
principles to contingent circumstances.” [22] The question
that remains unanswered by Traditionalists is how to apply such
principles in the present circumstances of modernization. Guénon
responds to this problem with an expectation of the end of the
age of modernity based on Hindu cosmological ideas. In the meantime,
he suggests that what remains of Tradition may be preserved
by certain elites who are initiated into the sophia perennis.
Quinn suggests, on the basis of his readings of Coomaraswamy
and Guénon, that this inellectual elite might serve a function
similar to that of the Hindu Brahmans as a priestly caste to
reestablish Tradition after the passing away of the modern age.
The
scenario painted by the Traditionalists seems unlikely, and
may God forbid any such destiny. Where there are Brahmans, untouchables
are usually not far. Barring global catastrophe, and/or the
reappearance of Imam Mahdi (may Allah hasten his return), it
is more reasonable to assume that modernization, along with
all its benefits and injuries, will continue to spread. The
challenge that faces Muslims today, is how to minimize the injuries,
how to ride out modernization so that it does not take the same
form among Muslims as it has in Christian society, how to preserve
the sacred norms and values prescribed for us by Islam in these
rapidly changing times. There are no simple solutions, no easy
answers. An insistence on fundamental principles is not enough.
The problem for Muslims is exactly how the fundamental principles
of Islam are to be applied in the situations in which we find
ourselves. Compromise is necessary because the traditional institutions
and cultural forms are not sufficiently flexible to accommodate
the changes with which contemporary Muslim societies are faced.
Moreover, there is much in the traditional institutions that
is not worth preserving. Traditional oppression, despotism,
and cruelty do not become justifiable for being Traditional.
Initiation into esoteric wisdom by an intellectual elite will
not suffice to reform society in accord with divine guidance.
Loyalty to Islam requires a realistic appraisal of the environment
in which we seek to live as Muslims and foster the flourishing
of Muslim communities. Part of this realism means understanding
how the conditions of contemporary societies differ from those
of pre-modern societies in ways that make the reinstatement
of traditional forms impossible or worse. Many of the
differences are due to technology. Some are simply the result
of the huge differences in the size of the populations of societies
then and now. Consider the concept of shurá (consultation).
In the small community of believers at the time of the Prophet
of IslamÕ consultation could be carried out through
direct conversation with recognized leaders of tribal groups.
When the community of believers comes to include millions and
tribal affiliations have been erased centuries ago, it will
be appropriate to adopt democratic institutions and apparatuses,
even in the absence of any endorsement of democratic political
theory. As another example, consider punishment. In Islamic
sources there is no precedent for the collection of fines or
prison sentences. Traditional authorities introduced prisons
and dungeons, and the conditions in such Traditional institutions
were notorious. It is neither practical nor moral to attempt
to regulate traffic with threats of Traditional forms of punishment.
Tradition is of no help in such matters. The example of traditional
Muslim societies may help us to understand how Muslims sought
to live in accordance with their religion, and in what ways
they succeeded and failed in this effort, given the circumstances
in which they lived. Change in traditional societies tended
to be gradual and rather slow, largely because of technological
limitations. This enabled traditional societies to forge an
accommodation of new elements with traditional principles and
values. Slow and gradual change is conducive to organic integrity
and harmony.
Today,
we have to find ways to live in accordance with Islam that are
appropriate to the exceedingly different circumstances in which
we live. Social changes are being driven by rapid changes in
technology that give no one time to adjust. This gives modern
society an ugly mismatched quality. While certain measures can
be taken to try to preserve some sort of proportionality, integrity
becomes more of a utopian ideal than a realistic aim. In this
effort, we can only rely on Allah and His aid as we seek to
sort through the social, political, cultural and theological
problems that face us.
[TOP]
Traditionalism
and Islamic Fundamentalism
The
term “Islamic Fundamentalism” is one that has been invented
by Western journalists by analogy with “Christian Fundamentalism.”
It is not a very apt term, but it has gained currency. In the
Sunni world it is used for groups descended from the Salafiyyah
movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In practice, any politically
active movement that opposes Westernization and calls for the
enforcement of Islamic law is termed “Islamic fundamentalism,”
whether Sunni or Shi‘i. Sometimes, those who take a reformist
or even modernist approach to Islamic law will also be considered
by journalists to be fundamentalists. Anti-Western rhetoric
accompanied by exhortations to return to Islam is sufficient
to brand one as fundamentalist. For the purposes of any insightful
understanding of contemporary Islamic political thought, “Islamic
fundamentalism” is a useless derogatory label.[23]
Since
Traditionalists might well be considered fundamentalists, according
to the way Western journalists and too many academics use this
term, one might hope to get a better understanding of Traditionalism
by contrasting it with other groups that could be called fundamentalist.
This issue is taken up by Dr. Nasr at several points in his
Traditional Islam and the Modern World. It is odd that
Dr. Nasr himself points out how inappropriate the label “Islamic
fundamentalism” is, yet goes to some pains to show that Traditionalists
are not fundamentalists, and retains much of the disparaging
rhetorical force of “fundamentalism.” A brief examination of
the reasons he gives to separate Traditionalism from fundamentalism
will help illuminate the extent of the extremism in the Traditionalist
critique of modernity. Once that extremism is made clear, we
can try to begin to articulate a more balanced view of the issues
of tradition and modernity.
In
traditional societies we find an integrated worldview centered
upon religious belief. In modern societies this integration
has been lost. To the extent that tradition remains in Iranian
society, it is somewhat like a remnant of a civilization that
once occupied this land but has been long since disappeared.
[24] Under the circumstances, it makes as much sense
to oppose modernity as it would to oppose hurricanes. Dr. Nasr
writes:
If traditionalists
insist on the complete opposition between tradition and modernism,
it is precisely because the very nature of modernism creates
in the religious and metaphysical realms a blurred image within
which half truths appear as the truth itself and the integrity
of all that tradition represents is thereby compromised.[25]
Dr.
Nasr continues by contrasting the Traditionalist perspective
with that of fundamentalists and modernists. He also refers
to the fundamentalist view as counter-traditional and
pseudo-traditional, and sometimes revolutionary. [26] Often his distinction
between fundamentalism and traditionalism amounts to little
more than the accusation that fundamentalists are brutish and
ugly, while Traditionalists are refined and sophisticated.
The traditionalist
and the so-called ‘fundamentalist’ meet in their acceptance
of the Quran and Hadíth, as well as in their
emphasis upon the Sharí‘ah, but even here the
differences remain profound. As already mentioned, tradition
always emphasizes the sapiential commentaries and the long
tradition of Quranic hermeneutics in understanding the meaning
of the verses of the Sacred Text; whereas so many of the ‘fundamentalist’
movements simply pull out a verse from the Quran and give
it a meaning in accordance with their goals and aims, often
reading into it a meaning alien to the whole tradition of
Quranic commentary, or tafsír. As for the Sharí‘ah,
tradition always emphasizes, in contrast to so much of current
‘fundamentalism’, faith, inner attachment to the dicta
of the Divine Law and the traditional ambience of lenient
judgment based upon the imperfections of human society, rather
than simply external coercion based on fear of some human
authority other than God. [27]
As for the interpretation of the Qur’an and ahádíth,
true scholars pay attention to the commentary tradition, whether
they are fundamentalists or traditionalists. Those who write
popular works are more inclined to play fast and loose with
the texts, but this cannot be considered a distinguishing feature
that separates traditionalists from other fundamentalists. With
respect to the Divine Law, as well, fundamentalists emphasize
inner attachment as much as Traditionalists, and its implementation
has been harsh among some fundamentalists as it has been among
some traditional authorities, while others who would be considered
fundamentalists have an attitude as lenient as any of which
tradition might boast.
Outside
of this domain, the differences between the traditional and
the counter-traditional in Islam are even more blatant. Most
of the current ‘fundamentalist’ movements, while denouncing
modernism, accept some of the most basic aspects of modernism.
This is clearly seen in their complete and open-armed acceptance
of modern science and technology…. Their attitude to science
and technology is in fact nearly identical with that of the
modernists, as seen on the practical plane in the attitude
of Muslim countries with modern forms of government compared
to those which claim to possess one form or another of Islamic
government. There is hardly any difference in the manner in
which they try to adopt modern Western technology, from computers
to television, without any thought for the consequences of
these inventions upon the mind and soul of Muslims. [28]
Does this mean that the defining distinction between traditionalists
and fundamentalists is that whereas the latter accept Western
science and technology, the traditionalists reject it? In this
way, traditionalism is paraded as a more total rejection of
modernity than that found in other Islamic groups. Fundamentalist
governments are condemned for pursuing Western science and technology.
What would a traditionalist government do? In fact, the traditional
sultans who rule over various Muslim countries today are no
less eager for Western science and technology than the so-called
fundamentalist governments. Indeed, the only rejection of television
and other aspects of Western technology at the level of government
that seems to approach what is advocated by Dr. Nasr was to
be found in the recently overthrown Taliban government in Afghanistan,
a paradigm of Islamic fundamentalism if ever there was one.
Dr.
Nasr continues to distinguish traditionalism from fundamentalism
in art and politics. In art, everything traditional is supposed
to be beautiful, while the fundamentalists are tasteless. In
general, those who are involved in what are called fundamentalist
movements in Islam tend to be from the lowest strata of society,
while traditionalists tend to be a very small group of highly
educated people, some of whom, from Coomaraswamy to Dr. Nasr,
have made important contributions to art criticism and aesthetics.
The difference in attitudes toward the arts seems to have much
more to do with education than ideology.
In
the political realm, Dr. Nasr criticizes fundamentalists for
accepting Western political institutions and ideas, including
“revolution, republicanism, ideology and even class struggle
in the name of a supposedly pure Islam.”
[29] Among extremist fundamentalists, it is not
difficult to find people who reject all of these Western innovations
that Dr. Nasr condemns.
In
another essay, the differences are portrayed by Dr. Nasr in
another way. He claims that fundamentalists usually share:
opposition
or indifference to all the inward aspects of Islam and the
civilization and culture which it created, aspects such as
Sufism, Islamic philosophy, Islamic art, etc. They are all
outwardly oriented in the sense that they wish to reconstruct
Islamic society through the re-establishment of external legal
and social norms rather than by means of the revival of Islam
through inner purification or by removing the philosophical
and intellectual impediments which have been obstacles on
the path of many contemporary Muslims. These movements, therefore,
have rarely dealt in detail with the intellectual challenges
posed by Western science and philosophy, although this trait
is not by any means the same among all of them, some being
of a more intellectual nature than others. [30]
This characterization, however, does not enable us to distinguish so-called
fundamentalists from traditional Muslim groups, for there are
Muslim groups that have been anti-intellectualist, anti-philosophical
and rather outwardly oriented throughout the history of Islamic
civilization. On the other hand, there are revolutionary Muslims
who have been philosophers and mystics, and if most are not,
this is merely a reflection of the general population. It is
to their credit that Guénonian Traditionalists are interested
in mysticism, art and philosophy, but that does not distinguish
them from other Muslims who do not agree with their ideological
principles.
In
short, the main differences Dr. Nasr elaborates between fundamentalism
and traditionalism is that traditionalism is more absolute in
its rejection of everything modern and Western. On this account,
fundamentalism seems to be downright moderate! The other difference
that he repeatedly emphasizes is that fundamentalism is crude
and rude, but this seems to reveal more about social background
than any defining difference in the essence of Traditionalism.
[TOP]
Balance
and Truth-Seeking
Instead of trying to build a sense of self-worth
based on the ruins of an idealized past, we need to seek whatever
truth becomes available to us in our changing circumstances,
regardless of whether they are enshrined in our own traditions
or come from modernity or anywhere else. The only once and for
all and always truths and standards that have been given to
us are found in Islam. On that basis and with the aid of our
limited intellectual faculties we should try to achieve a balanced
understanding of our station and its duties. The course of the
wise in moral affairs including politics and other issues pertaining
to culture and civilization seems to be one of moderation. Moderation
is not to be confused with lack of determination or an irresolute
stance on issues of faith or justice. Moderation means having
the wisdom to see the folly of extreme forms of modernism and
traditionalism, and choosing a just course between them.
Moderation requires an understanding of the current conditions of Muslim
societies today and of the elements shaping them: from global
market forces to popular religious beliefs and practices. How
our societies are shaped and changed is largely out of our hands.
Where we do have an opportunity to effect change or to modify
its direction in some way, we need the humility to admit that
the results of our interference in social, political and other
cultural affairs are often other than we would predict. This,
however, should not be cause for timidity, but for submission
to Allah in obedience to His commands, knowing that in the ordinance
of His prescriptions, He knows better. The violation of the
moral precepts given by human conscience and confirmed by divine
revelation to His prophets, peace be with Muhammad and his progeny
and with all of them, can never be excused as a means to obtain
otherwise desirable social or political goals.
Moderation requires critical analysis and evaluation of the character
of our civilization and the ways in which it is changing in
order to assess their positive and negative aspects according
to the standards of Islamic teachings and values. We need to
understand what can be done to minimize the negative effects
of the modernization taking place around us. It is here that
Traditionalist writings can be of assistance. They can increase
our sensitivity to how religious principles are reflected in
various areas of culture, and how modernization may do violence
to those principles. This is often overlooked by policy makers
and politicians, as well as academics. Traditionalist writings,
despite all the faults I have found with them in this paper,
are invaluable aids to increasing our sensitivity, or in the
popular expression, to consciousness raising with regard to
how modernization does violence to the integral character of
traditional cultures. Traditionalists share this feature with
post-modernist writers: both are engaged in a project of unmasking
various aspects of modernity. This is a task so valuable, that
no matter how much I may disagree with various points of the
Traditionalist position, I feel obliged to admit my indebtedness
to the Traditionalist articulations of the character of modernity,
especially in the indisputably erudite works of Dr. Nasr. However,
we also need to recognize what sorts of modern changes may bring
us into greater harmony with religious principles. The changing
roles that various social and cultural elements play allow them
to be in harmony with religious principles in some environments,
but contrary to them in others. Elements of traditional society
cannot be imported from the past with the expectation that they
can play the same integrative role in the new environment as
they did in their original context.
Moderation also requires critical analysis and evaluation of traditional
societies and their institutions. There is nearly consensus
among contemporary Muslim thinkers (with the exception of some
Traditionalists) that hereditary monarchy or sultanate is incongruent
with fundamental Islamic aims and values. Sultanate is oppressive.
It squanders national wealth for the sake of the luxury of a
few. History shows that when such power is placed in the hands
of a single person or group, and that person or group is accustomed
to luxury, it is easy for foreign control and domination to
crop up to the detriment of Muslim society, as in the Qajar
and Pahlavi collaboration with Russian and US agents, respectively.
Nothing can be retained solely for the reason that it is traditional,
and nothing can be rejected solely because it is modern, whether
in doctrine, economics, social institutions, forms of cultural
expression, or whatever.
Consider computerization.
Dr. Nasr condemns this as modern and untraditional.
[31] No doubt there is much about computer use that
clashes with Islamic aims and values. To a large extent, however,
it is unavoidable. On the other hand, there is much in computer
use that serves Islamic aims, e.g., accessibility to information
and facilitation of research, not to mention the more specifically
Islamic applications, such as Islamic software, Islamic internet
groups and magazines, searchable databases of ahádíth,
etc.. Traditionalist reasoning is valuable when it points out
aspects of modern culture and technology that conflict with
Islamic principles in ways that would ordinarily pass without
notice. In our enthusiasm for Islamic software, for example,
we might overlook the fact that Islamic education through a
computer program, no matter how detailed, is impersonal in the
worst way. Traditionally, the relation between student and master
is of utmost importance, for it is only in the context of such
a personal relationship that the master can correct misunderstandings
of the material presented to the student, and only in such a
context that the master can determine what materials would be
helpful for the student at a particular level, and what materials
might be harmful at that level. Obviously, the computer program
fails miserably by comparison. The solution, however, is not
to heap scorn on Islamic software as a violation of Traditional
principles of Islamic education. The software has its own advantages.
In present circumstances there just aren’t enough masters to
go around. In Iran today something like half the population
is under eighteen. For most, the choice is not between a computer
program and a master, but between educational and non-educational
computer use. This is just an example, but it could be repeated
endlessly. Modernization is a fact of life. Traditionalists
make some valid points about its failings, but on the whole,
people do not have a choice as to whether they would like to
live in a traditional or modern way. They find themselves caught
in the whirlpool of modernization.
In
the more theoretical realm, modernity pits history and all the
modern sciences against metaphysics. Some of my criticisms of
traditionalism revolve about this conflict. The history of the
world’s religions testifies to their particularities while a
metaphysical viewpoint seeks universal themes. The critical
historical attitude, once established, can never be banished.
There can be no restoration of metaphysics to its former authority.
This is felt nowhere so keenly as in theology. The error of
modernism is to believe that historical study makes metaphysics
otiose, merely another item for historical inquiry itself. The
error of traditionalism is to hope for a reassertion of metaphysical
principles in a victory over historical criticism. If we are
ever to move beyond the impasse of such errors, we will have
to learn how to integrate historical and metaphysical thought,
or, at the very least, some sort of uneasy truce will have to
be maintained between them. In some areas, both sides will have
to retreat. One problem here is that so much modern science
is built upon presuppositions that conflict with any sort of
traditional metaphysics. In order to realize integration, modern
science would have to be dismantled and built back up again
without its biases against religion and metaphysics. Even if
such a project could be successful, it would take several generations
of scholars in virtually all the fields of the modern sciences,
and while this work was going on, the established sciences of
modernity would not sit still. At this point, we can only learn
to live with it, and in this, modern history itself can help
us to see the biases against metaphysics that have come to permeate
the sciences as the products not of science itself, but of the
historical forces at work during the formative period of the
development of modern science. This recognition of the biases
of the culture of modernity including its sciences and history
is only the beginning of the sort of critique demanded by the
Mennonite theologian Jim Reimer:
…a rather
thorough critique of modern liberal culture and its assumptions
is necessary… but… it cannot be accomplished by using pre-Enlightenment
categories in their purity, or by recovering and conserving
the past in its pristine form. A recovery of classical categories
from antiquity is necessary for the purpose of judging and
transcending our own culture…, but these concepts must first
go through the crucible of the Enlightenment before they can
be effectively appropriated…. [32]
Theology,
in my opinion, does not have the freedom to be or not to be
“modern,” or “non-modern” for that matter, as if its practitioners
sit above the historical flow of things making such choices.
It has been shaped by modern scientific, rational, and historical
assumptions. We participate in the age of which we are a part.
The fact is that new paradigms cannot arbitrarily be created
or chosen; they emerge gradually replacing older paradigms
that have lost their power. [33]
The
challenge for Muslims and Christians is to find a way through
the process in which faith is maintained despite the evils of
modernization. The hope for Muslim societies is that they may
move beyond modernization without suffering all the injuries
this has brought in the West, in shá’ Allah.
[TOP]
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